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THE ALIEN AND THE ASIATIC IN AMERICAN LAW. By Milton R. Konvitz. 
New York: Cornell University Press, 1946. Pp. 299. $3.00. 
This treatise on the two chief outcasts of our constitutional system, the 
alien and the Asiatic, is a timely probing of the depth of our American democ- 
racy. Its list of legal atrocities constitutionally committed upon Americans or 
would-be Americans who did not have the foresight to be born in the proper 
places has all the macabre fascination of old ethnology books which recount 
the horrors found by missionaries among benighted peoples lacking properly 
supported agencies of civilization and true religion. 
Today, more than ever, such a study has meaning even for native-born 
Americans of whitest ancestry. For none of us can be sure of rights which 
are denied to the meanest member of society. And since the Supreme Court 
in Korematsu v. United States' has held that American citizens of a feared or 
hated stock may be taken from their homes and put behind barbed wire with- 
out notice of charges, indictment, jury trial, or other opportunity to be heard 
in self-defense, all of our civil rights are subject to forfeiture if nations or 
races from which any of us are descended become feared or hated. 
Indeed, the implications of the Korematsu case go even further. For, apart 
from the fact that a number of American citizens, of the same racial strain 
as Korematsu, refused to take a test oath of allegiance after imprisonment, 
the only ground advanced in the Supreme Court opinion for upholding the do- 
mestic deportation of American citizens without trial or hearing was the ethno- 
logical ignorance of the Court as to the truth or falsity of the theories upon 
which the military acted. 
The language of the Court, "we cannot reject as unfounded... We can- 
not say that the war-making branches of the Government did not have 
grounds for believing. . . . we could not reject the finding . . . ," taken in 
conjunction with the anthropological opinions of the Commanding General 
concerning "ties of race, culture, custom and religion," leaves all our civil 
rights dependent upon race theories of generals and upon the extent to which 
judges are equipped to identify decayed anthropological doctrines. 
The extent to which discriminations based on race and alienage have been 
written into our Federal and State laws, particularly in the years since the 
first World War, is not generally appreciated. So far as I know, the only 
comprehensive effort to trace the scope of such discrimination prior to Profes- 
sor Konvitz's work was made under Nazi auspices in an effort to prove that 
Americans were doing circumspectly or hypocritically what the German Gov- 
ernment did more honestly.2 
The list that Professor Konvitz gives us of discriminations against aliens 
1. 323 U. S. 214 (1944). 
2. A chapter of this dissertation by Heinrich Krieger on American Racial Law ap- 
pears under the title Principles of the Indian Law and the Act of June 18, 1934, 3 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 279 (1935). 
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and Asiatics that have been upheld by the courts is impressive and dismaying 
About a hundred Supreme Court cases bearing on the constitutionality of 
such discriminations are patiently analyzed. The cases cover exclusion and 
deportation of persons considered to be aliens, disallowance of citizenship, 
denaturalization, exclusion from various professions and occupations, dis- 
abilities with respect to landholding, segregation, miscegenation, registration, 
and internment. What stands out in a review of these cases is the consistency 
with which the Supreme Court has followed the pseudo-science of the "supe- 
rior Aryan race" invented by the precursors of Fascism, Gobineau and 
Houston Chamberlain. And this, as Professor Konvitz demonstrates, has not 
been merely a matter of yielding to popular waves of hysteria that culminate, 
from time to time, in legislation. Rather, the Court has repeatedly pressed the 
claims of racist theory beyond any existing legislative expression. Although 
Congress put a stop to the naturalization of Chinese in 1882, it was the Su- 
preme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sutherland, that in 1922 put a 
stop to the naturalization of other Asiatics.3 And when it put a stop to the 
naturalization of Asiatics it provided itself with a bootstrap to uphold dis- 
criminatory land laws, a year later. 
"It is obvious that one who is not a citizen and cannot become one 
lacks an interest in, and the power to effectually work for the wel- 
fare of, the state, and, so lacking, the state may rightfully deny him 
the right to own and lease real estate within its boundaries."4 
Thus we denied the most basic of human rights to half the world's popu- 
lation, discredited western liberalism in Asia, and stirred up resentments 
which finally culminated in war. It became a simple matter thereafter to 
argue that descendants of human beings so mistreated by us must hate us, that 
"The very fact that no sabotage has taken place to date is a disturbing and 
confirming indication that such action will be taken,"5 and that as a matter of 
self-preservation we must put behind barbed wire the children of parents 
whom we wronged a generation ago. This pattern, based on fear or hatred of 
racial groups we have injured, is not entirely a new pattern in American con- 
stitutional law. It began in our relations with Indians-about which Profes- 
sor Konvitz is substantially silent, despite the claims of the blurb writer on 
the back cover. It took new roots when Congress decided in 1882 that the best 
way to stop violence against Chinese immigrants was to bar them from our 
land and that the best way to prevent violation of their rights as citizens was 
to prevent those who were already here from acquiring citizenship. But the 
real impetus to racial intolerance came in the wake of the first World War, in 
3. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U. S. 178 (1922); United States v. Thind, 261 U. S. 
204 (1923). 
4. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 220 (1923). 
5. General De Witt's words, quoted in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 
241 (1944). 
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accordance with a Chinese proverb that the first result of a war is for the 
adversaries to adopt each other's vices. It was in that atmosphere that we 
wrote on our statute books in 1924 that Germans are four times as worthy of 
admission to our country as Hungarians, that Japanese are not worth admit- 
ting at all, etc. And it was in this atmosphere that Justice Sutherland, in 1922 
and 1923, wrote the historic opinions of the Supreme Court which put a stop 
to the naturalization of Japanese,6 Hindus, and other Asiatics, on the basis of 
a super-Aryan myth that excludes even the original Aryans of India,7 not to 
mention children born in Bethlehem and other towns of Asia Minor.8 
With that characteristic love of buck-passing which is so fundamental a 
part of the judicial process the ethnic views of the Court in 1923 were as- 
cribed to the Founding Fathers, who were not present to deny the charge. The 
draftsmen of the 1790 Naturalization Act, we are told, had thought of white 
men as blue-eyed and light complexioned and while the word "white" might 
possibly be stretched to cover the "dark-eyed, swarthy people of Alpine and 
Mediterranean stock,"9 it could not be stretched to include Caucasians of 
darker hue. One wonders: Is this a nation or a beauty contest that Justice 
Sutherland is talking about? 
So far as I know, the annotators have never gone to work on the Declara- 
tion of Independence. But when they do, they will find in Professor Kon- 
vitz's book a good many potential footnotes to the phrase about all men being 
created equal: for example, that Chinese immigrants are unable "to make any 
change in their habits or modes of living" ;1O that English aliens cannot be 
trusted to operate pool rooms in a law-abiding manner ;11 and that the Anglo- 
Saxon names of our earliest legislators are an index of their racial origin and 
of an intent to legislate for "their kind."12 These are cardinal dogmas of a 
judicial anthropology that will one day have the same respect from thinking 
men that is now paid to the judicial economics of earlier decades. 
The case materials and the legislation with which Professor Konvitz deals 
are dissected with a deft scalpel that uncovers the unspoken premises and 
hidden consequences of statutes and decisions. Relevant legal and sociological 
literature is brought to bear on the issues analyzed. Frequent reference to 
arguments in briefs before the Court illuminates the scope of decisions. Apt 
quotations from biographies of the justices help to clarify judicial motiva- 
tions. The volume is thus an excellent example of the realistic jurisprudence 
that has now moved from the stage of manifestoes and polemics to the stage 
of constructive workmanship. 
If there are weak spots in the volume, it is only fair to say that, by and 
6. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U. S. 178 (1922). 
7. United States v. Thind, 261 U. S. 204 (1923). 
8. In re Aimed Hassan, 48 F. Supp. 843 (1942). 
9. United States v. Thind, 261 U. S. 204, 213 (1923). 
10. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U. S. 581, 595 (1889). 
11. Clark v. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392 (1927). 
12. United States v. Thind, 261 U. S. 204, 213 (1923). 
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large, they are not original with the author. One finds, for instance, the com- 
mon notion that propositions are either positive or negative and that the latter 
are harder to prove than the former13-which overlooks the ever-present pos- 
sibility of finding positive synonyms for negative terms and vice versa. There 
is the unguarded statement that immigrants do not furnish their share of 
leaders of liberal and radical thought14 which is no truer than the view that 
immigrants are as a class liberal or radical. The statement that Arizona 
Indians may not marry whites15 has not been true since 1942.16 In Arizona, 
Indians are the only people who can marry whom they please. But these, like 
the typographical errors that mar some footnote citations, are all trivial de- 
fects in a work that contributes so largely to the understanding of our Con- 
stitution and our national ethics. 
One's chief regret is that the volume is too short. The author's sympathy 
for the downtrodden leads him to terminate his analysis when he finds an 
injury done to an alien here which we should resent if it were done to an 
American abroad. But this appeal to justice is generally unconvincing to 
those-and they are not all "corrupt politicians"17-who think a nation's 
judges and law-makers have enough to do in protecting their own citizens. 
What would carry more weight in such quarters-which are highly and prop- 
erly influential-would be a demonstration that while discrimination seldom 
destroys an outcast group, it very often corrupts the group that practices it 
and comes to rely upon it. 
We have developed a civilized criminal law not by idealizing burglars, but 
by recognizing that the welfare of each of us depends upon the existence of 
legal procedures that accord even to burglars certain basic constitutional 
rights. Perhaps if the defenders of our civil liberties made less effort to 
arouse sympathy for cranks and Communists whose rights have been invaded 
and concentrated more on the harm that is done to the public health and 
safety when certain necessary apertures in the social anatomy are sealed, they 
would find more receptive audiences. Certainly the right to advocate unpopu- 
lar ideas is of interest to very few, but the right to hear and consider such 
ideas put forward by others is of interest to all of us. 
So, too, I think that a critique of our treatment of Asiatics and aliens, as of 
Negroes, Indians, Jews, and other under-privileged minorities, would be far 
more effective if, instead of concentrating on the effects of persecution upon 
the lives and feelings of the victims, a stronger analysis were made of the 
effects of such persecution in weakening our democracy, threatening our 
peace and security, imposing upon our Government new burdens of bureauc- 
racy, and undermining the national economy. It seems to me that the critique 
13. P. 223. 
14. P. 36. 
15. P. 232. 
16. Ariz. Laws 1942, c. 12, § 1; ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 63-107 (Supp. 1945). 
17. P. 157. 
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which Professor Konvitz gives us would be vastly strengthened if he went on 
to analyze the injury done to society when we cannot hire a nurse to tend a 
sick child because she has not yet been naturalized, or cannot be naturalized 
because of her ancestry; when we cannot buy fresh and wholesome vegetables 
at reasonable prices because good farmers are driven off the soil for racial 
reasons; when we find ourselves involved in war situations because State 
legislatures are reckless in their insults to foreign nationals without ballots; 
when we are deprived of the aid of great scientists and much-needed techni- 
cians by a gerrymandered immigration law which makes the acceptibility of 
pilgrims to these shores dependent upon their ancestry rather than upon their 
capacities to contribute to American life; or when our intellectual life and the 
development of a more mature labor movement are dampened by threats of 
deportation and by the growth of a "thought-police" bureaucracy that shows 
no signs of dissolving as our alien population dwindles. 
It is well that one who appraises a course of decisions should make explicit 
the ethical assumptions from which he proceeds. This Professor Konvitz 
does with candor. On the title page of the volume appears a provision of the 
Mosaic law: "But the stranger that dwelleth with you shall be unto you as 
one born among you, and thou shalt love him as thyself."18 Judged by that 
civilized standard we have fallen a long way in the last quarter century of our 
national life. Yet, for the sake of the record, it should be noted that this was 
a statutory standard to which even the judges and administrators of the na- 
tion to whom the Mosaic law was given often failed to adhere. There is not 
much to choose between the "chosen people" theories of Ezra in Ezra 10: 
16-17 and of Justice Sutherland in 260 U. S. 178 and 261 U. S. 204. 
Still, the commandment of Leviticus 19: 33-34 retains its vitality and its 
capacity to inspire human effort after more than 20 centuries. Perhaps the 
Declaration of Independence will, too. 
FELIX S. COHENt 
TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION. By Edward S. Corwin. New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1947. Pp. 182. $2.50. 
FROM the moment I became interested in Constitutional Law, the works of 
Edward S. Corwin of Princeton have been indispensable to me. First I was 
told, and then I learned for myself, that in the field of the Constitution and 
the Supreme Court he is a leading historian, interpreter and commentator.' 
Needless to say, I turned to this volume of five lectures on Total War and the 
18. Lev. 19:33-4. 
t Associate Solicitor, United States Department of the Interior. 
1. One may note, with or without comment, how many great students of the Consti- 
tution and the Court do not teach in law schools. 
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